Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2004

Rose Gibbons and Austin K. Tiernan v. R.G. Frazier
and Utah Copper Company, a Corporation :
Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Unknown.
B. L. Liberman; R. A. McBroom; Geo. Y. Wallace; Attorneys for Petitioners.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Tiernan v. Utah Copper, No. 4378.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2485

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

1ENT

UTAH SUPREME COURT
UrClL.r
.•

T NO

i -

M51MKupreme Court of the State of Utah

ROSE GIBBONS and
AUSTIN K. TIERNAN,
Appellants,
vs.
R. G. FRAZIER and
UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Respondents.

Application for Rehearing
B. L. LIBERMAN,
R. A. McBROOM,
GEO.

Y. WALLACE,
Attorneys for Petitioners.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may
• n acontain
i f M u ierrors.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
ROSE GIBBONS and
AUSTIN K. TIERNAN,
Appellants,
vs.
R. GL FRAZIER and
UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Respondents.

Application for Rehearing
The petition of Rose Gibbons and Austin K. Tiernan, appellants above named, respectfully prays that the
Court grant a rehearing of this appeal; and for grounds
of their petition respectfully represent that it appears
from its decision heretofore filed herein that the Court
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I?
Did not consider and decide all of the material questions involved in the case.
II.
Overlooked certain controlling decisions, which ought
to affect the result.
III.
Based its decision on wrong principles of law.
IV.
Misapplied or overlooked divers matters of fact and
of law which ought to materially affect the result.
All of which will more fully appear from the brief
following and respectfully submitted.

Attorneys for Appellants and Petitioners.
The undersigned, B. L. LIBERMAN, GEO. Y. WALLACE and R. A. McBROOM, attorneys for Rose Gibbons
and Austin K. Tiernan, appellants above named and parties to the foregoing petition for rehearing, hereby each
certify that in his opinion there is good reason to believe
that the judgment of the Court heretofore filed herein is
erroneous and that this cause ought to be re-examined.
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In Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157,172, the Court
speaking by Mr. Justice Frick, said:

)

"We desire to add a word in conclusion respecting the numerous applications for rehearings
in this court. To make an application for a rehearing is a matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions for rehearings in proper cases. Wlu.n this court, however, has considered and decided all of the material questions involved in a case, a rehearing
should not be applied for, unless we have misconstrued or overlooked some material fact or facts;
or have overlooked some statute or decision which
may affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or have
either misapplied or overlooked something which
materially affects the result. * * * If there
are some reasons, however, such as we have indicated above, or other good reasons, a petition for
a rehearing should be promptly filed, and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be scrutinized
by this court.''

In terms the opinion now on file refused to pass upon
the issue of adverse possession and estoppel; the two defenses which controlled the decision of the trial court.
We cannot therefore be charged with attempting to reargue, on this petition, matters heretofore determined by
the Supreme Court.
Furthermore the Supreme Court in its opinion now
on file saw fit to go outside the briefs submitted by counsel for the respective parties and, if we may be permitted
to say so, briefed the case for itself. From that it must
inevitably follow that in reaching its conclusions, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Supreme Court did so without the aid of argument of
counsel. I n short, the decision of the Court now on file
is bottomed upon a rule found in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Montana in the ease of Hickey v. Anaconda C. M. Co., 33 Mont. 46, 81 Pac. 806, a case which
was not cited in the briefs of counsel either for the appellents or for the respondents.
Conscious of embarrassment which must result in addressing to an appellate court an argument against itself,
it is nevertheless necessary, when it is conceived that a
court of last resort has based its rulings upon a wrong
principle of law, to be critical in terms, and in this instance our respect for the Supreme Court of Utah is only
increased by the thought that if we are able by reference
to respectable authority to convince it that it has fallen
into error, it will promptly and cheerfully correct itself.
It is evident that the Hickey Case, supra, came to the
Court's attention from its own independent research. I t
is equally clear that the decision heretofore reached by
the Court in this case is based upon the principle announced in the Hickey Case to the effect that the title
derived by patent relates back to the last of the series of
acts required by state law to perfect a mining location.
Language of that purport is, to be sure, found in the
opinion of the Montana Court, but that it is dicta we have
Mr. Chief Justice Brantly for it. We quote his concurring
opinion in full:
" Brantly, C. J . I concur in the result. I am
in doubt, however, as to the time to which the title
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by patent relates—whether to the date of the
completed location, or to the date of discovery. X
am inclined to think it relates to the latter. As a
decision of this point is not necessary, I refrain
from expressing an opinion/'
In Lindley on Mines, 3rd Ed. Sec. 783, Page 1921, that
pre-eminent authority, commenting on the rule in question, has the following to say:
"According to a majority of the Supreme
Court of Montana, in order to apply the doctrine
of relation to any date prior to the entry, the date
of which is inserted in the patent, a valid location
complete under the state law must be shown, and
that date is the date of the performance of the
last of a series of acts required by the state law,
i. e., the recording of the certificate. If this certificate when offered in evidence does not comply
with the state law and is invalid, the date of its
recording cannot be made available for purpose of
relation.
'' Chief Justice Brantly, concurring in the result reached by the majority, is of the opinion
that it should relate to the discovery, and in this
we think the chief justice is sustained by the
weight of authority."
As late as 1918 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit on an appeal from the U. S. District Court
for Montana has the following to say respecting the
s
Hickey Case:
" T h e earlier decisions of the Supreme Court
of Montana were in line with the cases above cited.
Butte City Smokehouse Lode Cases, 6 Mont. 397,
12 Pac. 858; Talbott v. King, 6 Mont. 76, 9 Pac.
434; Chambers v. Jones, 17 Mont. 156, 42 Pac.
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758. They were overruled, however, in Hickey v.
Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 33 Mont. 46, 81 Pae.
806, the court there holding that if the declaratory
statement was invalid, a location was not effected, and that in such a case there was no date
to which the patent could relate antecedent to the
date of the application therefor, which, the court
said, was the first intimation to the government!
that an attempt had been made to locate the claim.
The court reasoned that if the locator did not proceed according to law, he initiated no right to
which the patent could relate, and observed that
of course the government, being the owner, might
issue patent upon the showing which Congres^
saw fit to exact. In brief, the court held that the
issuance of the patent was an adjudication only
of compliance with the laws of the United States,
and not of compliance with the laws of the state.
The case stands alone in so holding. The reverse
was held, as we have seen, in Mining Co. v. Tunnel
Co., supra."
Butte & S. C. Co. vs. Clark Montana E. Co.,
248 Fed. 609, 613.
In short the opinion in the Hickey Case appears to
be one of those unfortunate decisions which appear every
so often in many jurisdictions where the court departs
from established principle and which accomplish nothing
beyond working injustice in a particular case and embarrassment to succeeding generations until the harrassed
personnel of the same court finally overrules the precedent, or the legislature passes some act to give relief.
Thus in Montana, as Mr. Justice Gilbert states in his
opinion in the case of Butte & S. C. Co. vs. Clark Montana
R. Co., supra, at page 612 of 248 Fed. Ri.:
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
" I n view of the harshness of the rule so established, the Legislature at its session next following the decision in the Hickey Case, enacted that
the issuance of a patent for a mining claim shall
be deemed conclusive that the requirements of the
laws of the state relative to location and record
have been duly complied with, and it validated all
mining locations under the laws of the state.''
The case which Mr. Justice Gilbert refers to supra
as "Mining Co. v. Tunnel Co." is Creede & Cripple Creek
M. & M. Co. v. Uinta T. M. T. Co., 196 U. S. 337, one of
the classics in the mining law of this country, and it is
interesting to remark that in his opinion Justice Brewer
approves both the text of Lindley and the text of Snyder
on Mines. The language of the latter to the effect that the
relation is "generally from the first act towards claim
and appropriation,' 9 is, we submit, clearly right in principle. It is the energy, skill and perseverance of the discoverer which the policy of our mining laws rewards,
and when he is on, the scent the law protects his possession while he is verifying his prospects.
If the patent issued to the McGuire is not only evidence but conclusive evidence that it was a valid location
prior to patent (and as to that there is no doubt) and if
the true doctrine of relation is that the title acquired by
patent relates back to the discovery and not to the completed location, and if it is a controlling factor in the
determination of this appeal that a "discovery" was
made on the McGruire Placer prior to the Valentine Scrip
patent or even prior to Bentley's entry in February,
1876, then it becomes wholly immaterial that the plainDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tiffs' proof failed to show that the claim was staked or
marked, posted or recorded. The only fact to be determined by the proof is the date of the discovery.
Before further discussing that feature, however, it
will perhaps be germane to refer to another principle of
law which the Supreme Court of Utah has many times announced and applied. Thus, in Duggins v. Colby, 45
Utah 335, 339, the Court says :
' ' This is a law case, and we have no power to
look into the evidence for the purpose of determining what the findings upon any particular
question or phase of the case should be. That, in
such cases, is the exclusive province of the court
or jury, and all we have the power to do is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence
to support the verdict of the jury or the findings,
or of any particular finding of the court. If
there is competent evidence in this regard therefore (which we very seriously doubt) upon which
the court could have based a finding respecting the
measure of damages which we have suggested, yet
it is unavailing to us, because, as pointed out, we
have no power to make findings in law cases, nor,
in the first instance, suggest what, under the evidence, they should be.
F o r the reasons indicated, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District
Court of Sevier County, with directions, to grant
a new trial and to proceed with the case in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Of two things there can be no doubt; the case at bar
is a law case (an action in ejectment) and the trial court
made no finding whatsoever respecting a discovery on the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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McGuire & Company Placer. J u s t what the reason for
the rule, that in a law case the Supreme Court will not
make findings, may be we do not presume at this time
to say, but, that it is a dangerous thing to do without
the benefit of argument of counsel is well illustrated by
the opinion of the Supreme Court herein now on file.
By referring to pages 10,11,12 and 13 of the printed
reply brief submitted by the appellants prior to the oral
argument, it will be seen that the issue, which the opinion
of the Court now on file states to be the controlling factor in this case, was tendered by the appellants in the
court below and objection by the defendants thereto was
made. Then followed extended argument in which the
appellants stated to the opposing counsel and to the trial
court that the reason why they tendered proof of a discovery on the McGuire Placer prior to and at the time
the location notice was filed for record was to forestall
the very theory upon which the Supreme Court has heretofore affirmed the judgment. To that tender defenda n t s ' counsel again objected, and when the tender was
urged, because the argument might be made that the time
of the discovery had not been shown by the plaintiffs, the
defendants stated in open court, and it appears in the
Bill of Exceptions (page 62), " W e are not questioning
the discovery on the McGuire Patent. I t is not in the
case.'' And t h a t ' ' Counsels' position is that the McGuire
& Company Placer is wholly apart from this investigation and has no place in this case." (Bill of Exceptions,
page 63.) And the trial court then informed counsel
that he agreed with the position thus taken by the de-
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fendants, but finally ruled, that the plaintiffs might, if
they insisted, prove a discovery on the McGuire & Company Placer as such, at the same time refusing to permit
the plaintiffs to show the character of the surrounding
country, or that properties immediately adjoining the
McGuire Placer were at the time of its location being successfully operated as placer mines. (Bill of Exceptions,
page 64.)
Under such circumstances the appellants felt justified in making their proof of discovery as bald as possible
and furthermore, under the authorities, as we shall presently see, it was impossible for them under the court's
rulings, to prove a discovery to the extent of the latitude
allowed by all of the authorities. As stated in our reply
brief under such circumstances we felt abused to have
respondents in their brief in the Supreme Court even
advert to the question of discovery at all, and if the
the Supreme Court will re-read the respondents'
brief (page 50) it will be observed that they renew
their theory, which has been throughout, that the doctrine of relation is out of the case and so far as priority
between the titles is concerned, the case should be decided
on the theory that the Valentine Scrip Patent being prior
in time of issuance must prevail over the later patent
issued on the McGuire Placer; that having divested itself
of title by the earlier patent the Government could convey nothing by the later patent.
I t was for the reason that the respondents stated
in open court that they did not question the discovery on
the McGuire Placer that the testimony, such as it is, which
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was ultimately introduced in the court below, was not abstracted in the printed record on appeal. And even when
respondents' counsel adverted to the point in their brief,
we did not deem it neecssary to abstract the record fully
in our reply brief. We did not believe that the Supreme
Court, under all the circumstances, would finally come to
a decision on that theory, which the trial court repudiated
and opposing counsel stated on the trial was not in the
case and upon which the trial court made no findings
whatsoever.

Adverting now to the opinion of the Supreme Court
now on file we find the first comment oil the evidence
reading as follows: " N o evidence whatever was offered
to show that the mining claim in question had been
marked on the ground so that its boundaries could be
readily traced." As to that, we hope we have already
shown that that circumstance is immaterial, because the
true doctrine of relation is that title derived by patent
relates back to the discovery. The fact that the claim
was duly marked is conclusively proven by the subsequent issuance of patent.
Commenting on the evidence as to a discovery, the
opinion states, " There was nothing in this evidence to
show what values, if any, in gold were recovered or by
whom any discovery was m a d e . " By referring to the
Bill of Exceptions (page 65) we find the witness Gibbons
testified, " T h e y was working there and they used to
pan gold. Mr. McGuire used to. I have seen him pan
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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gold down on the rimrock, you know where it went down
into the gulch/ 9 Mr. McGuire was one of the locators
of the claim and in fact it was named after him. Therefore, to find as a fact that there was no evidence of a
discovery by any of the locators is not sustained by the
record.
And when the opinion states that " I t is fairly inferable from the testimony that the gravels had been panned
down on the rimrock as far as they could go before the
location of the claim in question/' the implication, as we
read it, is that the court finds that the claim had been
worked out or proved to be a failure before it was located.
As a matter of fact, all that the witness meant by his testimony in that respect was that when they got down so
far they encountered water and had to change their
method of work. In fact, on reading the Bill of Exceptions it will be noted that the witness several times
started to tell about the water encountered and the drain
ditch that was dug to collect and carry off the water, but
in each instance was stopped because his testimony in
that respect might have gone far afield from the point
sought to be adduced.
As for the language in the opinion that there was
nothing in the evidence to show what values in gold were
recovered we respectfully submit that that circumstance
in and of itself in none of the accepted authorities is a
controlling factor of a sufficient "discovery."
At the bottom of page 777, Lindley, 3rd Edition, the
author states:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"With reference to lodes and veins, Judge
Hawley's definition seems to answer all practical
purposes:
When the locator finds rock in, place containing mineral, he has made a discovery within th£
meaning of the statute, whether the earth or rock
is rich or poor, whether it assays high or low.
It is the finding of the mineral in the rock in place,
as distinguished from float rock, that constitutes
the discovery and warrants the prospector in making a location of a mining claim.''

The rule adopted by the Land Department, Castle v.
Womble, 19 Land Dec. 455, 457, is as follows:
" Where minerals have been found, and the
evidence is of such a character that a person of
ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a
reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine, the requirements of the statute have
been met. To hold otherwise would tend to make
of little avail, if not entirely nugatory, that provision of the law whereby ' all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States
* * * are * * * declared to be free and open
to exploration and purchase.' '7
In the case of Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U. S. 313 (cited
by the Supreme Court in its opinion now on file) Justice
Brewer, after quoting the above rule announced by the
Land Department and after quoting Lindley 's text to the
effect, that the true rule is that the facts which are within the observation of the discoverer and which induce the
discoverer to locate should be such as would justify a
man of ordinary prudence, not necessarily a skilled
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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miner, in the expenditure of his time and money in the
development of the property, states the rule generally in
the following language, no more or no less:
" T h e r e must be such a discovery of mineral
as gives reasonable evidence of the fact, either
that there is; a vein or lode carrying the precious
mineral, or if it be claimed as placer ground, that
it is valuable for such mining."
It would seem to be a needless expense to reprint
in this petition what is already printed in our Reply
Brief commencing at the bottom of page 10 and continuing on to the top of page 13. We can not help believing
that the Supreme Court, when reading that portion of
our Reply Brief, overlooked its significance. The Bill
of Exceptions, as there abstracted, shows beyond question that when the appellants sought to introduce evidence of a discovery on the McGuire Placer, prior to and
at the time of its location, the respondents objected and
inquired what the purpose of the examination might be.
Thereupon, counsel for the appellants frankly and fully
stated both to opposing counsel and to the trial court
exactly what we sought to prove and the reason for it.
In other words, we then advised the trial court and counsel that we apprehended that the Supreme Court might
take the precise view of this case, which it did take in
the opinion now on file, and sought to introduce evidence
to satisfy that theory by proving a discovery prior to
and at the time of the location of the claim. It was then
that counsel for the respondents stated that they did not
question the discovery on the McGuire Placer and that
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their theory was, that the McGuire Placer is wholly apart
from this investigation and has no place in this case.
But the argument continued and the trial court, although
stating in so many words that he agreed with the respondents, and saw nothing whatever in the theory and tender
of the appellants, nevertheless, finally ruled, as will appear at the top of page 13 of our Reply Brief, that we
could not show the character of the surrounding country
nor could we show that successful mines were being operated on properties immediately adjoining the McGuire
ground, but permitted us to show what our activities had
been on the McGuire ground, prior to and at the time of
location and no more.
Commencing in the middle of page 9 of our Reply
Brief, we quoted at length from the case of Cascaden v.
Bortolis, where the case was reversed because on the
issue of discovery the trial court had excluded testimony
of the character of the surrounding country and of the
operations of miners upon adjacent properties.
At pages 774 and 775 of Lindley's 3rd Edition, the
author quotes, from and cites a number of authorities to
the effect that where conditions are similar to adjacent
geological characteristics which had induced other miners
to locate claims in the same district and which by continued development were found to be a p a r t of a welldefined ore body, that was sufficient to justify a belief
as to the existence of ore bodies within the limits of the
ground located. And the author quotes from the Supreme
Court of Idaho as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"If a miner has discovered certain mineral
indications which he has followed up with the result that a rich and valuable ore body has been
developed therefrom, it seems clear that another
miner finding similar indications and conditions
on contiguous ground or in the immediate vicinity
would be in a measure justified in following up
these evidences with reasonable expectation of
finding mineral deposits, and this is true even
though the indications, rock and deposits found
are such as the expert scientist, geologist and mineralogist in their finest theories tell him are not
evidence of mineral deposits or even that they are
evidences of the entire absence of mineral."
In its opinion now on file the Court uses the following
language: "An effort was made to prove by one witness
that there had been a mineral discovery but in our opinion the proof was wholly insufficient to establish the
fact," citing Chrisman v. Miller, supra; Steele v. Tanana
Mines R. Co., 148 Fed. 678.
We have heretofore seen that all Mr. Justice Brewer
said in the Chrisman Case is this, "If it be claimed as
placer ground (it must appear) that it is valuable for
such mining."
We respectfully request the Court to re-read the
Steele Case in connection with this petition for a rehearing. As we read the language of Mr. Justice Gilbert, all
the testimony before him went no farther than the following:
" The locator secured colors of gold, and in some instances fairly good prospects' of gold."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Another witness testified, that the result of his panning was such as miners are in the habit of calling good
prospects of gold.
Another witness found colors of gold in several pans.
And Mr. Justice Gilbert says: ' ' The sum and substance of this evidence is not that gold had been discovered on the claim in such quantities as to justify a person
of ordinary prudence in further expending labor and
means with a reasonable prospect of success, but that
colors of gold had been found which were fairly good
prospects of gold."
Under such evidence the rule is well established that
to constitute a discovery the law requires something more
than conjecture, hope or even indication. (Lindley's 3rd
Edition, page 771.)
We now abstract the record commencing at page 64
of the Bill of Exceptions. The witness, Michael Gibbons,
was on the stand and testified as follows: " I know the
character of the surface ground on the McGuire & Company Placer. At the time it was located it was a gravel,
and at that time those gravels were being panned or
sluiced for minerals, and minerals were recovered. On
the west side they had a hydraulic working all the way
from where the Bingham & Garfield Depot now is, down
through the gulch where the so-called Maxwell property
now in controversy is situated, and then to the north of
the Maxwell gulch, they were working and used to pan
gold. Mr. McGuire used to, I have seen him gold pan
right.from the town on the rimrock where it went down
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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into the gulch. That was on what is now the McGuire
Placer, but it had not been located at the time I am speaking of. Coming down to the time that the McGuire Placer
was located they were operating it when they located.
They went down and drove a drainage ditch out, and
right after they located—".
Q. Mr. Gibbons, what I want to know, and this is
all I want to know, is whether at the time the McGuire
Placer was located the McGuire Placer gravel had been
panned or sluiced, and gold values recovered.
A. "Well, it was panned down on the rimrock as far
as they could g o . "
Two things must be evident from the foregoing testimony, the first is that the work on the McGuire prior
to and at the time of its location was rather extensive,
and the other is that actual gold " v a l u e s " had been recovered. We submit that it is a matter of common terminology in mining communities, to make a distinction between gold values and mere traces or colors of gold which
may show as a result of panning. Anyway, that was a
distinction that the examining counsel sought to make
and if the trial court had seen fit to make a finding on
the subject, we entertain no doubt that he wrould have
drawn the conclusion from the testimony, that a valid discovery had been made on the McGuire Placer prior to
and at the time of its location. In announcing his decision Judge Wight said:
" I f the question in this case involved only th£
property rights acquired under the patents, the
Court might be inclined to the opinion maintained
by the plaintiffs, that is, that the placer patent reDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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lated back to the original location and established
priority, but the adverse possession on the part of
the defendants is so clearly established that the
case must be determined on that question."
(Abs. 4.)
In this connection it should be remarked that
throughout the trial the defendants and respondents were
consistent and treated the question of discovery as out of
the case. Had they seen fit to cross examine the witness
Gibbons respecting the preliminary wrork on the MeGuire
which he testified about, it might very well be that his testimony would have been qualified and to a more or less
extent impaired. But the Court will note that the respondents treated the question of discovery as out of the case
and forebore to cross-examine Mr* Gibbons along those
lines. Indeed they could not very well have done anything else.

In, its opinion now on file the Supreme Court says:
"We assume as settled principles of law that
the locator of a mining claim acquires a vested
right therein by virtue of his location; and when a
valid location of a mining claim has been made,
which, by subsequent proceedings, is conveyed to
the locator by patent from the United States, the
title of the patentee, by the doctrine of relation,
relates back to the time of location. The major
premise for these rules, however, is the existence
of a valid location."
To -say that a chicken is a fowl rests on the premise
that a fertile egg was laid from which it was hatched. And
yet it is no more impossible for a chicken to come into
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this world in any other way than out of an egg than it is
impossible that a patent to a mining claim should issue
except after a valid location. There can be no doubt about
it, that the patent to the McGuire Placer must rest upon
a valid location prior to its issuance.
What, permit us to ask, is the reason underlying the
doctrine of relation in any case? Is it not evident that
its only function is to protect a right against intervening
claims prior to the time the right initiated is perfected.
That is the reason back of the doctrine of relation wherever applied, and if the doctrine of relation goes back to
the last act instead of to the first act it has in effect been
made to lose its efficacy and the reason for the doctrine
fails.
The leading case in the United States is Gibson v.
Chouteau, 13 Wall 92, where commencing at the bottom
of page 100, Mr. Justice Field says:
"By the doctrine of relation is meant that
principle by which an act done at one time is considered by a fiction of law to have been done at
some antecedent period. It is usually applied
where several proceedings are essential to complete a particular transaction, such as a conveyance or deed. The last proceeding which consummates the conveyance is held for certain purposes
to take effect by relation as of the day when the
first proceeding was had. Thus, in the present
case, the patent, which was issued in 1862, is said
to take effect by relation at the time when the survey and plat of the location made in 1818, were
returned to the recorder of land titles under the
act of Congress. At that time the title of the
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claimant to the land desired by him had its inception, and so far as it is necessary to protect his
rights to the land, and the rights of parties deriving their interests from him, the patent is held to
take effect by relation as of that date.''
As the Court says, supra, "The locator of a mining
claim acquires a vested right therein by virtue of his location." We of course, readily agree with that; but what
we ask can an owner of a mining claim do after he has
secured patent that he cannot do before patent? We say
it positively, that patent gives to the locator practically
no additional property rights. Thus, the owners of the McGuire Placer, if they had never secured patent might have
maintained this action in ejectment on their location just
as well as on their patent. Why then refer to the doctrine
of relation at all, if the relation is back only to the completed location and the locator is bound to prove his location and every step in the process irrespective of the fact
that he has a patent.
In final analysis that is the result of the rule announced in the Hickey Case. As heretofore shown the
legislature of Montana abrogated that rule immediately
after the decision was rendered. Later the United States
Court in Montana refused to follow it and on appeal the
Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the District Court.
Butte & S. C. Co. vs. Clark Montana R. Co., 248 Fed. 609.
The result of Judge Gilbert's holding is that any infirmity in the location is cured by the subsequent issuance of patent. Certiorari was asked from the Supreme
Court of the United States and denied. (247 U. S. 516.)
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And yet both the Supreme Court of Utah in its opinion now on file and the Supreme Court of Montana in
the Hickey Case recognize the doctrine of relation. Indeed, that is necessary because it is established doctrine.
The fallacy in the rule announced in the Hickey Case lies
in this: I t recognizes the doctrine of relation and yet
when it comes to apply it, gives to the owner of the patented premises nothing by reason of it. If the owner of
a mining claim is bound to prove his completed location
in order to enjoy the doctrine of relation, then he acquires
nothing by that doctrine, because he could maintain every
action to protect his property as a locator which under
the rule he can maintain as a patentee, and under the rule
his proof in each instance must be the same.
We most respectfully urge the Supreme Court of
Utah, before it commits itself to the rule announced in
the Hickey Case to reconsider the question.
In passing upon petitions for a rehearing in years
gone by, the Supreme Court has frequently referred to
the natural feeling on the part of the defeated party that
the decision of the Court is wrong. And in that same
connection the Supreme Court has said that they can not
hope to convince defeated counsel, who must find solace
in the fact that the responsibility for its decisions rests
with the Supreme Court. We do not suppose that the
Supreme Court would believe that we were very sincere,
if we stated that we are not disappointed because of the
decision herein now on file. But we have studiously attempted to avoid in this petition and brief any language
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which might be offensive or which the Supreme Court
would have to excuse, if at all, as the result of zeal on
behalf of our clients. We did hope and expect that a
decision would be rendered herein which would clarify a
number of doubts that exist in the minds of many lawyers
at this bar, respecting adverse possession of the surface
of mining claims. But what "greets us s a i r " is that we
had studied the law of our case before the trial and realized that the doctrine of relation might play an important
part in the decision. By referring to pages 57-66 of the
Bill of Exceptions, the Court will see how desperately
we tried to prove our case as the Supreme Court now says
wras incumbent upon us, and the Court will note that we
met with nothing but opposition from opposing counsel
and from the trial court; opposing counsel justifying
their objection to the proof offered by stating that they
did not question the fact of a discovery and that it was
out of the case.
And finally does it meet the ends of justice to render a judgment herein of affirmance, as has been done,
instead of remanding the case* for a finding on the question of discovery and relation. If we are wrong in insisting that the rule in the Hickey case is not the law and if
it was incumbent upon us to prove every act in the course
of the location of the McGruire Placer prior to the Valentine Scrip entry by Bentley, still in view of the fact that
patent ultimately issued and it could only issue after notice to the world, and opportunity to contest, is there not
a presumption that we could readily have done that very
thing, if the trial court had permitted us ?
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It cannot be said that the appellants have suffered
an adverse decision on the ultimate merits.

The failure

of proof, if any, was not because the evidence was lacking, nor because appellants' counsel were ignorant of the
law. Every effort was made to inform opposing counsel
and the trial court of the relevancy of our offer of proof,
and it was then that opposing counsel stated, that they
did not question a discovery on the McGuire Placer; that
it was not in the case.

(Bill of Exceptions, page 62.)

Is it not competent for us to inquire, what did we
leave undone that we ought to have done under such circumstances. In an action on a contract, it might very
well be incumbent on a plaintiff to prove that he had performed on his part. But if when he offers so to do, his
opponent states in open court, that the defendant does
not question performance on the plaintiffs' part, is the
plaintiff to suffer an adverse decision in a court of last
resort because he did not prove that fact willy nilly?
Had we assigned error, that the trial court improperly restricted our proof of discovery, the Supreme Court
might very well have said that the error if an error was
not prejudicial because the excluded evidence could only
have gone to prove an admitted fact. We know of no
rule which requires an appellant to assign as error, the
failure of the trial court to make any particular finding.
All an appellant can do is to assign error in some finding which the trial court actually makes, and as to that
the record is as follows:
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Finding II.
" A t the time of the commencement of this
action and upon the occasion of the trial thereof,
the defendant Utah Copper Company was seized
in fee simple and in the possession and entitled to
the possession of that piece and parcel of land
mentioned and described in the complaint and
sought to be recovered in this action."
To that finding we assign error as follows:
Assignment of Errors I.
" T h e trial court erred in making Finding of
Fact No. II. Said finding is in effect a conclusion
of law, but notwithstanding, the proof shows without contradiction that the McGruire & Company
Placer Mining Claim ions duly located prior to the
entry of the west half of the east half of the northwest quarter of Section 26, and prior to the issuance of the agricultural patent to Bentley, and in
consequence the mineral patent conveyed title by
relation to the date of discovery and location.''

In the Creede & Cripple Creek Cases, both in Judge
Sanborn's opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals and
in Justice Brewer's opinion in the Supreme Court of the
United States authorities are cited to the effect, that
while logically a discovery must come first or prior to
marking the location, it is nevertheless competent to locate first and make a discovery later; but no location is
complete without a discovery and if discovery is made
after location, for purposes of relation, the relation can
not go back of the date of discovery, because there can
be no completed location without a discovery. And it is
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in that connection that both judges (perhaps unfortunately) use language to the effect that the relation goes
back to the completed location. A careful reading however, of both opinions shows conclusively that both judges
recognize that the doctrine of relation is that it goes back
to the inception of the right to-wit, to the discovery.
We respectfully submit that under all of the circumstances reflected by this record the ends of justice can
only be reached by at least remanding this case to the
trial court with directions to make findings on the question of a discovery on the McGuire & Company Placer.
Respectfully submitted,
B. L. LIBERMAN,
R.A. McBROOM,
GEO. Y. WALLACE,
Attorneys for Petitioners.
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